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Abstract
Adversarial attacks in the form of imperceptible pertur-
bations of normal images have been extensively studied,
and for every new defense methodology created, multiple
adversarial attacks are found to counteract it. In partic-
ular, a popular style of attack, exemplified in recent years
by DeepFool and Carlini-Wagner, relies solely on white-box
scenarios in which full access to the predictive model and its
weights are required. In this work, we instead propose dis-
tinct model-agnostic benchmark perturbations of images in
order to investigate the resilience and robustness of different
network architectures. Results empirically determine that
increasing depth within most types of Convolutional Neural
Networks typically improves model resilience towards gen-
eral attacks, with improvement steadily decreasing as the
model becomes deeper. Additionally, we find that a notable
difference in adversarial robustness exists between residual
architectures with skip connections and non-residual archi-
tectures of similar complexity. Our findings provide direc-
tion for future understanding of residual connections and
depth on network robustness.
1. Introduction
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are a network
of neurons that utilize convolutions rather than the tradi-
tional matrix multiplication. Certain groups of nodes and
neurons can be simplified into ”layers”, which are speci-
fied based on function and structure, and every layer must
be able to receive a weighted input and transform said in-
put into an output. CNNs are composed primarily of two
types of layers: convolutional and pooling layers. Convo-
lutional layers can undergo n-dimensional convolutions (2
dimensions is shown):
(f ∗ g)(c1, c2) =
∑
a1,a2
f(a1, a2) · g(c1 − a1, c2 − a2) (1)
which, in turn, allow for backpropagation, allowing the
CNN to retrace its steps in-case it ever approaches an incor-
rect solution[14]. On the other hand, pooling layers allow
for feature detection, using spatial maps to group nearby
and like pixels. In conjunction with other types of lay-
Figure 1: (Left) Images from MNIST that model ResNet-50
initially classified correctly. (Right) Images from MNIST,
now perturbed, classified incorrectly.
ers and in distinct arrangements, certain architectural styles
have risen to the top, becoming state-of-the-art classifiers.
These recent advancements in machine learning have led
to ”Deep learning”, an extension dealing with deeper neural
networks (DNNs), particularly Deep CNNs. For these mod-
els, image classification remains one of the most popular
and robust tasks[35, 15], tasking the DNN with recognizing
patterns in computer vision and speech. Classification of
images stands frequently as a benchmark for newly devel-
oped architectures and data augmentation methods[32, 26,
12, 7].
However, only within the past decade did hardware im-
provements even allow for DNNs, which now handle its
massive amounts of training data on GPUs. Deep neu-
ral networks have come a long way, from tweaking archi-
tecture topology[13] to changing from ”deep” to ”wide”
[33]. Though many NNs exist, we derive our focus from
select deep networks and from a fully-connected, non-
convolutional network. Specific model and learner infor-
mation is further explained in Section 3.
Regardless of the model, each should be able to train
effectively enough so that it can generalize a variety of sit-
uations. For example, a cat classifier ideally should be able
to label a striped cat, a spotted cat, and a tabby cat all as
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Figure 2: Row 1 contains natural images in the ImageNet
dataset. Row 2 contains the original images, now altered,
given nearly imperceptible perturbations[19]. These pertur-
bations are universal; if ρ denotes the distribution of vectors
of images, kˆ defines a classification function, and v is the
perturbation vector, they are of criteria such that:
kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x) for ”most” x ∼ ρ (2)
a ”cat”. Frequently, however, the model will not be able
to generalize a variety of situations that human comprehen-
sion can easily determine. Most DNNs are widely suscep-
tible to confidently misclassifying images using perturba-
tions nearly imperceptible to the human eye (see Figures
1 and 2), which is counter-intuitive to conventional human
uncertainty.
But just how resistant are these DNNs to extremely gen-
eral attacks? Imperceptible perturbations are no longer
”imperceptible” on datasets consisting of small-sized im-
ages (e.g. 28x28 Fashion-MNIST[31]), and black-box
and white-box attacks (although possible on small-image
datasets) only aim to give a network an especially spe-
cific attack capable of tricking the model into outputting a
unique and incorrect label[22]. Our goal isn’t to force an
autonomous vehicle to classify a stop sign as a yield sign.
Rather, we propose four new general perturbations, each ca-
pable of being executed on any dataset. By executing each
perturbation on each model in varying degrees, we are able
to visualize the differences between our attack methodolo-
gies and architecture resilience. Our noise generations are
then compared to attacks of specialized nature, for example
DeepFool and Boundary Attacks.
In this paper, we discover various characteristics of pop-
ular model architectures using comparisons of learner re-
sults, both within and between our various perturbation
methods. Architecture features and depth are investigated
via comparing how they react to each magnitude of each at-
tack. Insight is also gained on a model’s response towards
perturbations in general, and we see if classification accu-
racy curves follow a certain shape.
2. Related Work
Despite their incredible success in the field of image
classification amongst many others, it is well known that
DNNs can be extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks:
carefully crafted modifications to inputs that can cause
models to misclassify. Since it was first shown that attacks
of an imperceptible nature could could be successful[28, 8],
multitudes of new attack methodologies have been proposed
since then.
More recently, DeepFool and Carlini-Wagner attacks[3]
have been proven highly effective in bypassing existing ad-
versarial defences and substantially reducing their effective-
ness. However, these two, along with the majority of suc-
cessful and notable attacks, require a white-box scenario in
which full access to the classifier and its capabilities is re-
quired. As such, inherent limitations exist to the practical
application of these attacks as such access is not always so
easily found.
Other researchers have delved into the concept of trans-
ferable adversarial attacks, which can find success in caus-
ing misclassification across a broad range of model archi-
tectures. [21] manages to exploit this property of transfer-
ability by constructing substitutes of an unknown black-box
model and creating adversarial attacks against the substi-
tute which are also successful on the black-box model. Fur-
ther studies on transferability have also lead to established
strategies for the generation of large proportions of transfer-
able examples[16].
Despite many defences proposed for every successful at-
tack (notably MagNet[18] and ”Efficient Defenses”[34]) it
has also been shown that such defences can be easily fooled
as well[4]. Moreover, the inevitability of adversarial ex-
amples has also been discussed[25], finding that for many
classes of problems, adversarial examples are inescapable.
Instead of attempting to develop effective defenses for
any specific attack, we build upon previous work in estab-
lishing network architectures and topologies that are more
robust to adversarial examples[9]. We seek to provide
guidelines on promoting resilience in networks through an
in depth examination of various architectures and general
attacks.
3. Methods
Although not necessarily a true ”attack”, we will define
each pixel generated using our adversarial noise techniques
as a basic adversarial attack. One generation results in one
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pixel changed, thus, one attack was executed.
3.1. Dataset
MNIST, a dataset of 70,000 28x28 pixel hand-written
digits, was used to train each model. We utilize a single-
subject dataset (a singular foreground and a singular back-
ground) to minimize the complexity of the task and gen-
eralize our experiments for more scenarios. For example,
using a dataset of traffic lights may only be useful in an au-
tonomous driving context or in a circle & color detection
context.
All images are resized from 28 by 28 to 56 by 56. Conse-
quently, the ”single-pixel” attacks are upscaled to four pix-
els in a 2 by 2 square. Relative to the original dimensions,
the attack on MNIST is preserved.
3.2. Adversarial Noise Generations
While there have been various papers documenting the
strongest adversarial examples[2], few have investigated the
threshold at which the model can successfully classify given
an image perturbation. Even fewer have considered the
weakest attack a DNN can misclassify on, although some
graceful methodologies do exist[1]. Alongside the simplest
dataset of MNIST, we use the simplest attacks, which we
divide into four distinct categories: Random Pixel Invert
(control noise), White to Black, Black to White, and Edge
to Altered. We start our attacks at a single-pixel generation,
and subsequently increase the proportion of pixels affected
until the number of attacks reaches 200. By starting with an
exceedingly weak one-pixel attack, we can slowly increase
the noise magnitude by increasing pixel count. This enables
us to capture all degrees of perturbation possible, from the
weakest to the strongest.
For the following methods, b is the brightness of the
pixel, of which values range from 0 (black) to 255 (white).
c is the constant used in the corresponding inversion algo-
rithms. Within the 3D array, n is the image index, and x
and y are pixel location indices x and y, respectively.
Random Pixel Noise. Inverts a random pixel. For pixels
with b > 127, noise is generated using Pythonic equation:
int(
255− b
c
) (by default c = 1.25) at location (n, x, y)
for all tensors in the MNIST test set.
(3)
For all other pixels, noise is generated using Pythonic equa-
tion:
int(255− b
c
) (by default c = 1.25) at location (n, x, y)
for all tensors in the MNIST test set.
(4)
c is any positive number, including floats. If c < 1, after
a continuous amount of generations, the image will con-
tinually approach gray. If c > 1, the image will instead
approach black and white extremes. Setting c = 1.25 oper-
ates as our control noise because the model should approach
a more extreme version of the image after each attack.
White Pixel to Black Pixel Noise. Inverts a random white
pixel (defined as b > 0) to black using equation (3) with
c = 2. In terms of human vision, this is a foreground-to-
background attack.
Figure 3: Example of White to Black attacks, with attacks
= 20.
We choose b > 0 as we set b > 100 previously, but
after 20 or more attacks, an outline of the digit appeared in
gray pixels (0 < b < 100). The model still managed to
misclassify frequently when given the gray outline of the
digit, even though the number appeared to be obvious.
Black Pixel to White Pixel Noise. Inverts a random black
pixel (defined as b < 100) to white using equation (4) with
c = 2. In terms of human vision, this is a background-to-
foreground attack.
Figure 4: Example of Black to White attacks, with attacks
= 20.
Edge Pixel to Altered Pixel Noise. Inverts a random edge
pixel. An edge pixel is defined as any pixel that is vertically,
horizontally, or diagonally adjacent to a pixel of opposite
color. The opposite color criteria is met when one pixel
has b > 127 and the other has b ≤ 127, or vice versa. If
the selected edge pixel has b > 127, equation (3) is used.
Otherwise, equation (4) is used.
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Figure 5: Example of Edge to Altered attacks, with attacks
= 20.
We choose these noise generations based on two factors;
human deduction and 2D image characteristics.
By inverting pixels based on certain criteria, none of
these generations preserve object identity, meaning that
many human perception tools (such as depth and the
ventral visual stream[5, 27]) become inapplicable. We
eliminate object-identity-preserving transformations, sub-
sequently placing our generations in the same category as
imperceptible perturbations.
But beyond avoiding warp and rotate attacks, we choose
these particular perturbations as they simulate various pos-
sibilities for noise in 2D images. For example, consider
White to Black. This method was made to imitate degra-
dation and fading away of an image foreground over time
(similar to how paint on a wall chips and fades away). Like-
wise, Black to White corresponds to random background
noise scattered around, and Edge to Altered corresponds to
”bad handwriting”; digits that are written too thin, too thick,
or uneven.
3.3. Learners
For our custom Fully-Connected (FC) network, we the-
orized the possibility of splicing pooling layers within and
changing the input dimensions after each pooling layer, but
after only adding one pooling layer, the result failed to
even come close to its original MNIST test-set accuracies.
Though it’s very possible that a particularly arranged Pool-
ing ∈ FC architecture may yield favorable results (VGG ar-
chitectures are more to be considered FC ∈ Convolutional,
see Figure 6), in most cases, splicing pooling layers in an
otherwise Fully-Connected network would adversely affect
the model and oversimplify the learning process.
Each model is trained on the MNIST train set with a
starting learning rate of 1e − 2 and momentum 0.9. The
learning rate decays by a factor of 10 every epoch. The
training process continues up until 99.0% validation accu-
racy is achieved or surpassed (the only exception being the
Fully-Connected network). Though the number of epochs
between each model becomes volatile, each should classify
at a very similar correctness. This is further authenticated
in Section 4, Table 1, where all models score similarly well
on an unaugmented test set.
Figure 6: Example of Fully Connected Layers (FC 4096)
placed after convolutional and pooling layers[17]. FC 1000
is the output layer. Traditional VGG-16 and VGG-19 nets
are shown.
Fully Connected Network. A feed forward neural net-
work, consisting of a single 3136-unit hidden layer, is
trained using our rules and methods explained above. 3136
was chosen to equal to the number of pixels in our upscaled
56x56 images.
ResNet-50. A default ResNet-50, consisting of a 50-layer
convolutional network with residual connections skipping
one or more layers[10], is trained using our rules and meth-
ods explained above.
ResNet-50V2. A default ResNet-50V2 is trained using
our rules and methods explained above. The difference
from the original ResNet-50 exists that a batch normaliza-
tion layer, then a ReLU function, is placed behind the initial
convolutional layer[11].
VGG-19. A default VGG-19, shown in Figure 6, is
trained using our rules and methods explained above.
EfficientNet-B1. A default EfficientNet-B1 is trained us-
ing our rules and methods explained above. Rather than
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scaling up height, width, and image resolution indepen-
dently, EfficientNet is upscaled via a compound scaling
method, consisting of:
depth: d = αφ
width: w = βφ
res: r = δφ
(5)
where α, β, and δ are constants ≥ 1 determined by a grid
search[30]. The architecture consists of a 3x3 Convolu-
tional layer, followed by various mobile inverted bottleneck
MBConv layers[29, 23].
ResNet-101, ResNet-34, and ResNet-18. Default
ResNets of deeper and shallower architectures are used for
differing depths within one architecture, ascertaining the
effect of depth on attack resilience
3.4. Experiments
The models were evaluated on each type of attack, start-
ing with attacks = 0 (the default, unaugmented test set).
Attacks were subsequently increased by increments of 10
to a max of 200 attacks, with the evaluation accuracies ag-
gregated in a 5x20 (5 different attacks, 20 iterations) array
for each model. After repeating this process 4 times, the
resulting accuracies were averaged to produce the final set.
Two separate experiments were conducted through this
process: one involving the first 5 learners, omitting depth
variant ResNets and keeping only ResNet-50s, and the other
including only ResNets with varying depths.
4. Results
4.1. Overall Results
Displayed in Figure 7 are each model’s test accuracy un-
der every attack, given a certain number of attacks. A table
of important values can be found on the following page.
Figure 7: Average adversarial accuracies (with sample
size n = 5) for ResNet-50, ResNet-50V2, VGG-19,
EfficientNet-B1, and our Fully-Connected Network are
plotted from attack = 0 to attack = 200. Similar trends
were observed when the sample size was increased.
The results show slight differences in performance be-
tween ResNet50 and ResNet50V2, with the latter consis-
tently testing 5-10% higher in accuracy on attacks. This
may be attributed to the slightly higher accuracy of ResNet-
50V2 in training, but it is unlikely that this difference is the
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sole factor.
Interestingly enough, VGG-19 seems to be the best per-
former in nearly all regards, with the exception of our con-
trol attack. EfficientNet-B1 displayed poor robustness to
our attack methods, with it ranking in or near the bottom for
three out of our four attacks. EfficientNet also performed
significantly worse on Black to White and Random Pixel
Invert attacks, testing between 20-30% lower accuracy than
the next lowest performer.
We included a Fully Connected Network model as a con-
trol, though it performed surprisingly well in contrast to our
expectations. Although it had the lowest accuracies in the
White to Black attacks, it outranked EfficientNet in every
other attack and even achieved second best accuracy con-
sistently throughout the Edge to Alter attacks. It’s relative
success given its simplicity, along with VGG19, suggest a
strong direction for understanding the differences between
residual and non residual architectures in networks.
The structure of each curve is presumably related to a
combination of model architecture and attack type; look-
ing at EfficientNet’s and ResNet’s curves, each seems to be
somewhat sigmoidal, but ResNet suggests an inverted sig-
moid in Random Pixel Invert and Black to White (whereas
EfficientNet remains a consistent sigmoid). And consider-
ing that the FCN typically only presents linear curves, it be-
comes evident that different architectures respond in fairly
different ways depending on the attack received.
4.2. Results Compared to Other Attacks
Attacks Classified by ResNet-50/CNN
DeepFool 13.0
Boundary 21.0
WtB = (200) 44.7
BtW = (200) 51.3
EtA = (200) 39.7
Pointwise 91.0
WtB = (40) 87.9
BtW = (40) 81.6
EtA = (40) 82.3
( ) = Number of Attacks
Table 2: Comparative results for our adversarial generations
with DeepFool, Boundary, and Pointwise attacks. DeepFool
and Boundary typically alter ≥ 200 pixels in the image,
while Pointwise typically alters ≈ 40 pixels.
DeepFool[20], Boundary Attacks[1], and Pointwise At-
tacks were performed on the test set and classified by a CNN
with 99.1% MNIST test set accuracy[24], similar (both in
structure and test set accuracy) to ResNet-50. We thereby
compare these accuracies with our noise generation accura-
cies for ResNet-50.
Attacks WtB BtW RPI EtA
ResNet-50
0 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20
10 98.17 95.72 96.08 97.90
40 87.93 81.59 81.25 82.31
100 69.01 70.92 64.19 56.90
200 44.71 51.25 30.24 39.70
ResNet-50V2
0 99.30 99.30 99.30 99.30
10 98.91 99.00 99.00 98.85
40 93.19 94.26 93.83 87.38
100 74.05 80.96 74.35 65.31
200 48.91 55.91 36.31 56.34
VGG19
0 99.31 99.31 99.31 99.31
10 99.07 98.40 98.47 98.70
40 97.36 94.51 93.98 92.98
100 89.35 83.10 75.48 78.71
200 74.83 62.14 36.33 73.19
EfficientNet-B1
0 98.70 98.70 98.70 98.70
10 97.65 96.98 97.08 97.14
40 92.05 85.99 87.02 82.63
100 75.44 46.02 47.75 57.24
200 53.07 13.28 17.73 48.49
Fully Connected Network
0 97.12 97.12 97.12 97.12
10 94.64 94.76 94.70 95.30
40 87.41 89.07 87.82 91.88
100 68.27 68.55 64.16 78.23
200 40.57 39.58 31.04 60.90
WtB =White to Black
BtW = Black to White
RPI = Random Pixel Invert
EtA = Edge to Altered
Table 1: Overall Attack Accuracies. Important values are
shown.
The ”degree” of attack is determined by the number of
pixels altered; equal degrees of comparison will be used,
meaning that the compared attacks will affect equal propor-
tions of their respective images.
Based on these comparisons, our attacks resemble Point-
wise attacks more closely compared to DeepFool and
Boundary perturbations, of which Pointwise represents the
weakest extreme and the latter two represent the strongest
extreme.
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4.3. ResNet Depth Results
We choose depth as our variable and display a graph of
ResNet at various depths, each classifying on every attack,
given a certain number of attacks.
The first three graphs are polarizing. The model seems to
be required to reach a certain depth in order to survive the
initial 50 attacks. At 34 layers, the model is nonresistant
to the initial attacks, but at 50 layers, the model classifies
well on White to Black, Black to White, and Random Pixel
Invert attacks. What remains interesting is the gap observed
Figure 8: Average adversarial accuracies (with sample size
n = 5) for ResNet-50, ResNet-18, ResNet-34, and ResNet-
101 are plotted from attack = 0 to attack = 200. Similar
trends were observed when the sample size was increased.
in the Edge to Alter attacks, where depth seems to be much
less of a ”threshold” needing to be met. Instead, each depth
performs notably better than the last, implying that Edge to
Alter requires a model with more parameters to test well.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that in general adversarial cases, a
greater depth and parameter count in a learner can improve
its classification accuracy. We have also demonstrated that
non-residual architectures appear to outperform their resid-
ual counterparts when standardized for complexity.
Intuition as to why VGG-19 and the FCN performed
better than expected can be sought for in the architec-
tural differences, namely that ResNet-50, ResNet-50V2,
and EfficientNet-B1 all contain residual shortcut connec-
tions. It is possible that ResNet-50’s and EfficientNet-B1’s
worse-than-expected performance is due to their residual
connections beginning with a weighted layer, whereas in
ResNet-50V2, Batch Normalization and Rectified Linear
Unit functions precede the weighted layer. The potential
issue of residual skips is absent for both VGG-19 and the
FCN, perhaps explaining the cause of their adversarial re-
sistance.
VGG-19 and EfficientNet-B1 do more poorly on
Background-to-Foreground (Black to White) attacks com-
pared to Foreground-to-Background (White to Black) at-
tacks, meaning that those models potentially value back-
ground information more than foreground information.
ResNet-50, ResNet-50V2, and the FCN, however, value
background and foreground information nearly equally.
This seems counter-intuitive to human convention, where
numbers are identified using their foreground image rather
than their background components, and it is likely that hu-
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man eyes will locate the foreground prior to the background.
The most obvious correlation discovered was the effect
of model depth on resilience. Due to ResNet’s ”thresh-
old” values at various depths, an increased model depth
and parameter count imply anywhere between a signifi-
cant increase to no change in classification accuracy. Over-
all, higher complexity and depth seem to benefit resistance
against adversarial attacks, although certain architectural
improvements that increase complexity may hinder resis-
tance as well.
6. Future Work
We hope to inspire further research on using adversar-
ial attacks to benchmark newly-vetted architectures. In
the future, we will likely conduct more rigorous exami-
nation of architecture features and their relation to model
resilience. In particular, we plan to investigate residual
networks greatly, experimenting with vast varieties of skip
connections between layers to determine their effects on re-
silience. Along with that, inquiry on model width and image
resolution’s effects must be established. Future work should
include a collection of components (blocks & layers used,
model complexity, etc.) of a Convolutional Neural Network
altered independently from one another.
The simplicity of the dataset MNIST cannot be ignored.
We wonder if the complexity of MNIST has any ramifica-
tions regarding the appearance of a depth ”threshold” in
classification accuracy. Specifically, we theorize that the
threshold disappears when the complexity of the task in-
creases, and that ResNet-101, when classifying more dif-
ficult images, will subsequently improve beyond ResNet-
50. Further research on this topic is necessary, however, to
prove or challenge this hypothesis.
Test set accuracy as a final metric may be useful in deter-
mining model performance, but determining why the model
performs in such a way is more difficult. Additional met-
rics should be considered, such as a ”confidence” metric,
capable of being introduced using a simulated Gaussian
process[6]. If we assign dropout at random to a network
output with input x∗ (as if dropouts were being used in
training), a sampling distribution of classification accura-
cies is formed, and its predictive variance Var(y∗) exists as
the confidence metric.
We anticipate to move yet another step closer to defini-
tive learner characteristics and metrics that determine
learner resilience to perturbations and attacks. This paper
offers various angles of insight as to what makes a learner
resilient, but more work is needed to determine causation.
We hope to have the resources in future undergraduate re-
search necessary to further and solidify our current claims.
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